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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate
Coi irt

of

iuri •.••.!•••

Appeals

.

pursuant

to

<•.<-; i.s nested

Section

in ""he Utah

7 8-2a-3 (2) (f) , Utah

Code

Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE

_A_ SUFFICIENT
TO
SUProh
CARRYING
POSSESSION

St d Li d a J 11

«i

L,\ .DEN "E PRODUCFA

:
A
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A,
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r
CONCEALED
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'nmra PM RAPHE!"'- • ' . -
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Review

When reviewing the findi ngs of a trial ji idge sitting withoi it
a jury, ar I appellate coi irt will overturn a guilty verdict only if
the verdict is clearly erroneous.
(Utah 1991).

State

v,

Taylor,

81 8 P.2d

1030

Al so, iho Uhth Supreme Court has stated:

When challenging the findings of fact of the
trial court on appeal, the appellant must show
that
the
findings
of
fact were
clearly
erroneous.
In order to show clear error, the
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings of fact
and
then
demonstrate
that
the
evidence,
including all reasonable
inferences
drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the
findings against an attack.
State

v.

Moosman,

794

P.2d

474,

omitted).

1

475-6

(Utah

1990)

(footnotes

ISSUE

Standard

2:

of

DOES DENNIES HAVE STANDING
TO CHALLENGE
THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE USED AGAINST
HIM
DURING THE IMPOUND AND INVENTORY
SEARCH
OF THE VEHICLE?

Review.

The factual findings underlying the trial court's decision
should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.

The trial

court's conclusions of law based on those facts are reviewed for
correctness.

State

v.

Jackson,

873 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1994).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, "Unlawful acts":
See Exhibit A.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504, "Carrying concealed
weapon":

dangerous

See Exhibit B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE

OF THE

CASE

This case involves a prosecution and conviction for violations
of

Section

76-10-504,

Utah

Code

Annotated

1953,

as

amended,

"Carrying concealed dangerous weapon," and Section 58-37a-5, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, "Unlawful acts" related to drug
paraphernalia,

i.e., possession of drug paraphernalia, both of

which are class B misdemeanors.

2

COURSE

OF THE

PROCEEDINGS

Prosecution In this rase war, * u >ntmt man I v illi ! he arrest of
< .

. Dennies on April 8, 199 5,

A bench trial was held bet ore

the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring in Ttlirci
D e p a i ! m o n t , « "M J u n e

-

>..

. ; ! ey

]'», 1 99 5,
DISPOSITION

IN

TRIAL

COURT

At trial, Denni es was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon
and possession of drug paraphernalia.

On July J. 1,

was sentenced to pay a fine and seive n jaiJ

1995, Dennies

form,

The court

suspended a substantial portion of both the fine and jail term and
placed Dennies on probation foi twelve month:!.

Dei n lies filed a

Not ice ui Appeal in this case on June 27, 1995.
STATEMENT

1.

OF

FACTS

On April 8, 1995, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Officer

Hudson of the West Valley City Police Department stopped a vehicle
in the vicinity
observed

that

of 4100 South 4000 West.

Officer

the vehicle had no taillights

or

Hudson had

brake lights.

R. 31, 37.x
2.

The vehicle contained three occupants.

Denni€?s was a

passenger in the vehicle, and, at the ti me of the traffic stop,
Officer

Iludson observed

passenger seat.

that Dennies was sitting

in the front

R. 32-33, 40.

"R" refers to the Record as paginated by the trial court
clerk in accordance with Rule 11(b), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
3

3.

Upon investigation, Officer Hudson determined that none

of the three occupants of the vehicle possessed a valid driver's
license.

R. 33, 37.

He further testified that the driver of the

vehicle said he did not know where the owner of the vehicle was.
R. 37.

Based upon that information, Officer Hudson had the vehicle

impounded.
4.

R. 33.
At the time of the traffic stop, Officer Hudson did not

observe a weapon inside the vehicle.
5.

Before

the vehicle

was

R. 39.

towed

to

the

impounded

lot,

Officer Gray of the West Valley City Police Department performed an
inventory search of the vehicle.
6.

R. 42.

During the inventory search of the vehicle, Officer Gray

found a knife, with a blade approximately six inches long, between
the passenger seat and center console of the vehicle.

R. 43.

In

this type of vehicle, a GMC Jimmy, a center console is located
between the driver's seat and passenger's seat.
7.

R. 38.

During the inventory search of the vehicle, Officer Gray

found, and both Officer Gray and Officer Hudson observed, a spoon
lying on the floorboard of the vehicle in front of the passenger
seat in which Dennies had been sitting.

R. 39, 43.

Officer Hudson

testified that the spoon was of a type commonly used to ingest
controlled substances, and that the spoon had a powder residue on
it.

R. 36.

Officer Gray testified that he also observed a powder

residue on the spoon, and, based upon his experience, that the

4

powder residue and scratches on the spoon indicated drug usage.
R. 43, 47.
8.

Officers Hudson and Gray also found numerous syringes in

the vehicle.

R. 38, 44.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

POINT 1:

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT
WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN
A
GUILTY
VERDICT ON THE CHARGES OF CARRYING A
CONCEALED WEAPON AND POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA.

The Record reveals that there was adequate evidence produced
at trial to support Dennies' conviction on the charges of Carrying
a Concealed Weapon and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.

The

testimony of the police officers established that the knife, which
was found tucked between the side of the passenger seat and the
center console of the vehicle, was concealed.

Also, it is clear

from the testimony that the weapon was within the control and the
easy, immediate, and ready access of Dennies, who was seated in the
passenger seat.
With respect to the drug paraphernalia, the officers testified
that they recognized the dry powder residue and scratches on the
spoon as being consistent with the use of the spoon in connection
with the use of controlled substances.

They also testified that

the spoon was found on the floorboard of the vehicle in front of
the

passenger

seat,

a

location

clearly

under

Dennies, who was seated in the passenger seat.

5

the

control

of

POINT

Dennies

2:

was

DENNIES HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
SEIZURE
OF EVIDENCE
USED AGAINST
HIM
DURING THE IMPOUND AND INVENTORY
SEARCH
OF THE VEHICLE.
ALSO,
THE STOP,
IMPOUND,
AND SUBSEQUENT
INVENTORY
SEARCH OF THE
VEHICLE WERE VALID.

a

passenger

in

the vehicle

and

asserted

no

possessory interest in either the vehicle, the knife, or the spoon.
Because he did not demonstrate any interest in the property seized
or an expectation of privacy in the place searched, he has no
standing to contest the validity of the search.
Furthermore, the testimony at trial established that the stop,
impound, and inventory search of the vehicle were valid.

First,

the stop was based upon the officer's observation that the vehicle
had no taillights or brake lights.

The impound of the vehicle was

proper, since no one in the vehicle had a valid driver's license,
and the driver told the officer that he did not know where the
owner was.

Finally, the inventory search was valid as a well

settled exception to the normal warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT

1:

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
TO THE TRIAL
COURT
WAS
SUFFICIENT
TO
SUSTAIN
A
GUILTY
VERDICT
ON THE CHARGES
OF CARRYING
A
CONCEALED WEAPON AND POSSESSION
OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal
case is governed by a clear and unambiguous standard.
Supreme Court has articulated that standard as follows:

6

The Utah

When reviewing the findings of a trial judge
sitting without a jury, this court will
overturn a guilty verdict only if it is
clearly erroneous.
State v.

Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987).

The Supreme Court has defined the "clearly erroneous" standard
as follows:
The definition of "clearly erroneous" in the
federal rule comes from United
States
v.
United
States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395,
68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948):
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when
although there is evidence to support it,
the
reviewing
court
on the
entire
evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.
Further clarification is offered by Wright &
Miller:
The appellate court . . . does not
consider and weigh the evidence de novo.
The mere fact that on the same evidence
the appellate court might have reached a
different result does not justify it in
setting the findings aside.
It may
regard a finding as clearly erroneous
only if the finding is without adequate
evidentiary support or induced by an
erroneous view of the law.
State v.

Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals followed the guidance of
the Utah Supreme Court by stating:
In
considering
the
challenge
to
the
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the
verdict . . . .
If, during our review, we
find some evidence or inferences upon which
7
i

findings of all the requisite elements of the
crime can reasonably be made, we affirm.
State

v.

Perry,

Gezmonto,

871 P.2d 576,

(Utah App. 1994) (citing State v.

868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993); citation omitted).

In this case, sufficient evidence was presented to the trial
court

to

support

a verdict

Concealed

Weapon

charge

charge.

of guilty

and

Possession

on both
of

the Carrying a

Drug

Paraphernalia

When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Dennies

has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence that supports the
verdict and then showing that even when that evidence is viewed in
a

light

most

insufficient.

favorable
State

v.

to

Hayes,

the

verdict,

860 P.2d 968

the

evidence

(Utah App.

is

1993).

Dennies simply has provided the court with a recitation of the
facts that support his position and, thus, has failed to meet the
"marshaling" burden.
The facts presented to the trial court, which support the
verdicts, are as follows.
Concealed

Weapon

In order to prove a violation of Section 76-10-504, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, "Carrying concealed dangerous weapon,"
the evidence must support a conclusion that the dangerous weapon
was "concealed" and also that Dennies was "carrying" the weapon.
The Record of the trial indicates that evidence supporting those
conclusions was presented to the trial court.

8

First, Officer
traffic stop.

Hudson testified that he made the

initial

At the time of the stop, Dennies was seated in the

front passenger

seat of the vehicle.

R. 33.

Officer

Hudson

testified that he approached the driver of the vehicle and asked
for a driver's license.

R. 32.

Despite this relatively close

contact with the vehicle and Dennies, Officer Hudson was not aware
of the presence of the knife until it was later discovered during
the inventory search conducted by Officer Gray.
Officer

Gray

R. 34-35.

testified that while conducting an inventory

search subsequent to impound of the vehicle, he located the knife
between the front passenger seat and the center console of the
vehicle.

R. 43.

The knife was discovered after Dennies had exited

the vehicle and no one was sitting in the front passenger seat.
Officer Gray testified that he was kneeling inside the vehicle, on
the passenger side, when he first noticed the handle of the knife.
R. 45.

He further testified that based solely on the visibility of

the handle, he thought the object might be a knife, but could not
be sure.

R. 45-46.

Upon retrieving the knife, Officer Gray found

the blade to be approximately six inches long.
Based
therefrom,

upon

these

facts

and

the

R. 43.

reasonable

inferences

the trial court concluded that the placement of the

knife met the objective standard of concealment.
Based

upon

the

same

facts,

Dennies

considered to be "carrying" the weapon.

was

also

correctly

Utah case law is clear

that a person does not have to have a weapon on his body in order
9

to be considered to be "carrying" the weapon.

The Utah Supreme

Court has stated:
To rule that the weapon must be on the person
would make possible the carrying of a deadly
weapon concealed on the seat of an automobile,
where it would be more readily accessible than
it would be if concealed on the person. No
such result is contemplated or permitted by
the statute.
State v.

Williams,

636 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1981).

The Williams

court

also stated:
As a factual matter, where the concealed
weapon is shown to be under defendant's
control and within his immediate, easy or
ready access, he will be deemed to be
"carrying" the weapon.

Williams,

at 1094.

In this case, there can be no doubt that the knife was located
within Dennies' immediate, easy, or ready access, since he was
seated in the passenger seat, and the knife was tucked between that
seat and the center console.

Also, the clear inference from the

facts presented at trial is that Dennies was the individual in
control of the weapon.

Based on the location in which the weapon

was found, i.e., tucked down the side of Dennies' seat, he was the
person in the vehicle who had the ability to quickly access and use
the weapon.

In fact, it can be inferred, based upon a normal

configuration of vehicle seats and consoles, that the weapon was in
a position where Dennies may have been in actual physical contact
with the weapon at times.

Also, the only other person seated in

10

the front of the vehicle, driver Terry Burgess, specifically denied
any knowledge of the knife.

R.

53.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was adequate
evidence presented to the trial court to support the conviction of
Dennies.

Possession

of Drucr

Paraphernalia

In order to find a violation of Section 58-37a-5, Utah Code
Annotated

19 53,

as

amended,

"Unlawful

acts"

related

to

drug

paraphernalia, the court must find that the spoon constituted drug
paraphernalia and that Dennies possessed the spoon with intent to
use a controlled substance.

In this case, the evidence is more

than adequate to support the trial court's conviction of Dennies.
Officer Hudson and Officer Gray both testified that the spoon
was covered with a dry powder residue.

R. 36, 43.

Officer Hudson

testified that the spoon was of a type commonly used to ingest
controlled substances.

R. 36.

In describing the spoon, Officer

Gray testified that, "Based on my prior experience and training as
a police officer, I would judge that to be powder

residue and

scrapes and marks from use of controlled substances."

R. 47.

Officer Gray also testified that during the inventory search, he
located numerous syringes in the vehicle.

R. 44.

Based on the observations of experienced police officers and
the fact that the spoon was found in close proximity to other drug
paraphernalia,

i.e.,

the

syringes,

the

trial

determined the spoon to be drug paraphernalia.
11

court

correctly

Dennies' possession of the spoon is based upon a theory of
constructive possession.

The Court of Appeals has stated:

It is well settled that the contraband need
only be shown to have been subject to the
dominion and control of the accused or, in
other words, within the accused's constructive
possession.
State v.

Salas,

820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991).

Both Officer Hudson and Officer Gray testified that the spoon was
found

in plain sight on the floorboard

passenger seat of the vehicle.

in front of

the front

This is the exact location where

Dennies was sitting at the time of the traffic stop and is clearly
an area
Dennies.

of

the vehicle

that was solely

under

the control

of

It would be difficult for any other occupant of the

vehicle to access this area without Dennies' exiting the vehicle,
unless they virtually climbed over Dennies.
It is a fair inference, based upon the location of the spoon,
that the spoon was solely in the possession of Dennies.
testimony

regarding

ownership

of

Bryan Frew, the owner of the vehicle.

the

spoon

was

The only

provided

by

Mr. Frew was not present at

the time the vehicle was stopped, but testified that a friend of
his had eaten a steak and some ice cream in the vehicle sometime
prior to April 8, 1995, and had left the knife and spoon in the
vehicle.

R. 57.

The trial court specifically stated that it found

no credibility in Mr. Frew's testimony.
Dennies' reliance upon the Salas

R. 69.

case is misplaced.

Salas

a case that has significantly different facts than this case.
12

is
A

comparison of the Salas
support

to

the

trial

facts with the facts of this case lend
court's

decision

to

find

constructive

possession by Dennies.
In
vehicle.

the

Salas

case,

the defendant

was

the driver

of

the

After being stopped by police, who conducted a search of

the vehicle, drugs were found under a back seat where a passenger
had been sitting.

Salas was charged with possession of cocaine

based solely on his ownership of the vehicle.
found

that

possession
important:

there was
of

drugs.

insufficient
The

The Court, in

evidence

Court

found

that

the

Salas,

Salas was

following

in

facts

"One passenger had better access to the spot where

cocaine was found than did defendant."

Salas,

at 1389.

Also, "The

drug itself was found in an area that was not easily accessible to
the defendant.

There had been a backseat passenger close to where

the drug was found . . . ."

Salas,

at 1389.

In the Salas

case,

defendant Salas' only connection with the drugs was his ownership
of the vehicle.

The facts lacking in Salas

that caused the Court

to find insufficient evidence of ownership are not lacking in this
case .
In this case, the drug paraphernalia was found lying right at
the feet of Dennies.

Unlike Salas, Dennies did have sole access to

the area of the vehicle in which the spoon was found.

No other

passengers in the vehicle had better access to the spoon than did
Dennies, and, in fact, the spoon was found in an area that was not
easily accessible to other passengers.
13

These additional

facts

distinguish this case from the Salas

decision and support the

conclusions of the trial court.
Based upon the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence in the
Record that supports the trial court's verdict of guilty on the
charge of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
POINT

2:

DENNIES HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE
SEIZURE
OF EVIDENCE
USED AGAINST
HIM
DURING THE IMPOUND AND INVENTORY
SEARCH
OF THE VEHICLE.
ALSO,
THE STOP,
IMPOUND,
AND SUBSEQUENT
INVENTORY
SEARCH OF THE
VEHICLE WERE VALID.

Dennies has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the search, since he was only a passenger in the vehicle.

This

issue has been addressed by both the United States Supreme Court in
Rakas

v.

Illinois,

439 U.S. 128; 58 L. Ed. 2d, 387; 99 S. Ct. 421

(1978), and the Utah Court of Appeals in State
1005

(Utah App. 1993).

v.

Scott,

860 P.2d

In both cases, the defendants sought to

suppress evidence found in vehicles in which they were passengers.
The

law

propriety

in both cases
of

a

search,

states
a

that

in order

defendant

must

to challenge
first

establish

the
a

legitimate expectation of privacy in the place being searched, and,
also, that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may
not be vicariously asserted.
In relying upon the Rakas

Scott,

at 1007.

decision, the Utah Court of" Appeals

stated:
Where a defendant asserts neither a property
nor a possessory interest in the automobile,
nor an interest in the property seized, he has
14

not demonstrated an expectation of privacy and
thus has no standing to challenge the search.
Scott, at 1007 .
The situation described by the Scott
situation presented
possessory

here.

interest

concealed knife.

in

R.

Dennies

the

59.

drug

court is identical to the

specifically
paraphernalia

disavowed

any

spoon

the

or

Also, Dennies presented evidence from

Mr. Frew that Mr. Frew was the owner of the vehicle.

R.

56.

Dennies asserted absolutely no property or possessory interest in
the

vehicle, the spoon, or the knife, and he therefore has no

standing to challenge the search.
The

Court

in

Scott

also addressed

the potential

defense

argument that since the City claims the items seized belong to
Dennies,
search.

the City

cannot

argue otherwise with

respect

to the

The Court stated:
Such an argument is not sufficient to meet
defendant's burden; defendant bears the burden
of proving his standing.
Such proof is not
made by pointing to an allegation
made by the
State,
especially
where, as here,
that
allegation is denied by defendant.

Scott, at 1008 (emphasis in original; citation omitted).
Even if Dennies was found to have standing, the stop, impound,
and subsequent
power.

inventory search were valid exercises of police

First, Officer Hudson testified that he initially stopped

the vehicle because it had no taillights or brake lights.
Vehicle

stops

incident

to

traffic

15

violations

committed

R. 31.
in an

officer's presence are clearly legal under Utah law.
Talbot,

State v.

792 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1990).
Officer

Hudson

testified

that

once

the vehicle

had

been

stopped, no one in the vehicle could produce a valid driver's
license, and the driver of the vehicle, Terry Burgess, said he did
not know where the owner of the vehicle was.
Hudson further

R. 33, 37.

Officer

testified that given the situation, "By policy,

we're required to generally impound the vehicle."

R. 37.

Based

upon this evidence, there is no indication that the impound of the
vehicle was in bad faith or in any way out of keeping with normal
police department procedures.
Finally, the law is also well settled that inventory searches
of automobiles are an exception to the normal warrant requirements
of

the

State v.

Fourth
Gray,

Amendment

of

the

United

States

Constitution.

851 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1993).

Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that Dennies has no
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the inventory search
conducted on the vehicle in which he was a passenger.
the evidence demonstrates

that

the vehicle

stop,

Furthermore,
impound,

and

subsequent inventory search were conducted in a proper manner in
conformance with existing law.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that sufficient evidence
was produced at trial to support the conviction of Dennies for
Carrying a Concealed Weapon and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia.
Also, Dennies has no standing to challenge the valid vehicle stop,
impound, and inventory search.

Finally, Dennies has failed to

marshal the evidence supporting the verdict against him and then to
demonstrate

that the verdict was without any basis.

Dennies'

argument is based only on his interpretation of the evidence, which
is not the only reasonable interpretation.

Contradictory versions

of the facts, without more, is not a ground for reversal.
Davis,

State

v.

111 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985).
The City respectfully requests that Dennies' appeal be denied,

and that the conviction of the trial court be affirmed.
DATED this 11th day of December, 199 5.

WEST VALLEY CITY

J.\^ichard Catten, Senior Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit A:

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5,
"Unlawful acts"

Exhibit B:

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504,
"Carrying concealed dangerous weapon"

Exhibit A

58-37a-5.

Unlawful acts.

(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack,
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert produce, process, prepare, test, analyze,
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper,
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor

Exhibit B

76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon.
(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case,
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon,
but
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition,
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, or
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be
guilty of a felony of the third degree
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons described in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall be
a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle

